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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 24, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant
replies to Appellee's brief as follows.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant (hereinafter "Brenda") takes issue with Appellee's (hereinafter
"Ivan") statement of facts as follows:
Ivan insinuates that the Zion loan was used solely for improvements on the
marital residence (Appellee's Brief at p. 5). Although Brenda concedes that the
loan was for twenty five-thousand dollars, not all of the monies were used for the
improvements (R. 73, trial transcript at p. 24, 55). By his own testimony, Ivan
also used that money for a 'cushion' and on furniture that he claimed that he built
to sell (R. 73, trial transcript at p. 39, 55).
Ivan's focus on Brenda using marital funds on her trailer is misleading.
Brenda's trailer was always her separate property and she expended her own

earnings on her trailer after she and Ivan separated (R. 73 at p. 82-85).
Contrary to the assertion that "Brenda concedes that 'it's clear from the
Complaint that respondent has no interest whatsoever in the residence they
shared'," there was never a concession of this sort (Appellee's Brief at p. 8).
Ivan has taken out of context of an otherwise poorly worded statement by the
undersigned.1 From the beginning, when the answer was filed, and through the
trial, Brenda claimed an interest in the marital residence (R. 5 at H 7).
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE NECESSITY OF AN APPRAISAL JUSTIFIED
A CONTINUANCE.

This Court should reject Ivan's position that Brenda failed to act with due
diligence (Appellee's Brief at p.8). The trial court never stated or even suggested
that the denial of the continuance was due to Brenda's failure to be diligent.
Rather, the trial court considered the parties' proffer and simply concluded that it
could reach a decision about the division without an appraisal, rendering a
continuance unnecessary:

The following is the sentence in context:
I know that it is going to be the petitioner's position, and
it's clear from the Complaint that respondent has no
interest whatsoever in the residence that they shared. I
believe it is a martial residence that she is entitled—
under the law is entitled to have an equity [interest] in
that home.
2

You've both been in these cases where someone is
claiming an interest in a marital residence. I think you
both have an idea where I am going to come out on that.
Just because something is used as a place for two
people who are married to live doesn't make it a marital
property. But just because somebody pays something
out of his own pay check, doesn't mean it isn't marital
property. Everything they earn during the term of their
marriage is "marital." So she may have a claim for the
extent for which the mortgage was reduced during the
term of the marriage. That would probably be the extent
of it. That may be offset by his claim if there is some
equity in the other direction with respect to her
residence. I haven't heard that. So I'm prepared to go
ahead and try this case.
(R. 73 at p. 11-12).
The problem with not having an appraisal was apparent when the value of
the home became disputed. At trial, Ivan claimed that the value was between
sixty and seventy thousand dollars (R. 73, trial transcript at p. 52). In his brief,
Ivan claims that the value is "impossible" to determine the value since "the value
of something is its fair market value, not what you pay your family for it."
(Appellee's Brief at p. 10).
Ivan's criticism of Brenda's failure to introduce evidence of the value of the
home during the marriage should be rejected (AppeNee's Brief at p. 10). This is
precisely what an appraisal would have addressed.2

Although Brenda did present some evidence by way of a market analysis,
an appraisal would have been much more desirable for the reasons stated to the
trial court and for the reasons set forth in Ivan's brief (R. 73, trial transcript at p.
7; Appellee's Brief at 10-11).
3

POINT II:

NO CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A
DEPARTURE FROM THE GENERAL RULE REGARDING
MARITAL PROPERTY.

There were no circumstances presented by Ivan justifying departure from
the general rule that each party is presumed to be entitled to 50% of the marital
property

See generally, Maxwell v Maxwell, ISA P 2d 84 (Utah Ct App 1988)

Brenda is asking is that this Court look to what had been realized as a
result of their joint efforts and allow both to share equally in that result

That

Brenda kept her trailer separate from the marital property adds nothing to the
analysis (Appellee's Brief at p 3)

That the parties were advanced in age adds

nothing to the analysis (Appellee's Brief at p 3) That the parties were married
for a short time adds nothing to this analysis (Appellee's Brief at p 3) That the
parties had an unhappy marriage adds nothing to the analysis (Appellee's Brief at
P 3)
Ivan disregards the general rule and simply starts arguing about Brenda's
trailer (Appellee's brief at p 5) Ivan takes the position that since Brenda allowed
her son to live in her trailer, she deprived him of a marital asset (Appellee's brief
at p 5) The only evidence presented to support this was Ivan's testimony that
there had been a discussion about fixing up the trailer and renting it "when we
decided to get married

we were going to fix it up and to rent But that never

did come about" (R 73, trial transcript at p 63)

4

There is no basis for Ivan to claim any interest in Brenda's trailer. The
trailer was her premarital property which Brenda chose to keep separate from the
marriage. All of the substantial changes made on the trailer were done post
separation so that Brenda would have a place to live (R. 73, trial transcript at p.
83-85). There is absolutely no evidence that the trailer lost its identity as
separate property.
The circumstances about the trailer stand in sharp contrast to the marital
residence. The marital residence is where both Ivan and Brenda devoted their
time and energy: In Ivan's own words, "it was a real dump, it wasn't liveable"
(R. 73, trial transcript at p. 60). Brenda's significant contributions to that home
should not be ignored.
The trial court's conclusion that Ivan's interest in Brenda's pension or
retirement plan and Brenda's interest in the marital home was a "wash" is not
supported by the evidence (R. 73, trial transcript at p. 126-127). This is
especially true since Ivan waived, in the complaint, an interest in each other's
pension and/or retirement plans (R. 2). Yet, the only waiver that was addressed
by the trial court was Ivan's waiver.
Not only did Ivan waive his interest in Brenda's pension plan in the
Complaint, but the trial court only speculated as to the increase in value either the
pension and/or the marital residence (R. 2 at fl6). Consider the following:
[Brenda] has an arguable claim there because she
5

moved in there, she helped to make it a nice place. She
helped with the landscaping, she may have helped him
with the work that he was doing to actually improve the
property, and she was there with him as a marriage
entity while the mortgage on the property was being
reduced. I would say parenthetically that I've just done
some rough calculations and it appears to me that the
mortgage was probably reduced by around $6,000,
$7,000, maybe $8,000 during the term of the marriage,
from what I know about interest rates and the terms of
this mortgage, and she may have added with her
landscaping efforts something like $2,000 or $3,000 to
the value. And she may have—it's almost impossible to
quantify what it meant that he was able to devote his
time to this because she was doing other things. He
was able to devote his time to improving the property
because she was doing other things . . . She may be
entitled to something if (the parties' income) was the
only thing that I was looking and it might be something
in the order of under $5,000. But at the same time, she
was accruing pension benefits at her work that he is
making no claim on. If those are seven percent of her
earnings, and if she was making $1,200 a month . ..
that's going to be about $1,000 a year. I think it may not
entirely offset it, but we're not talking about a big
difference here.
(R. 73, trial transcript at p. 126-127).
The trial court's speculation as to the decrease in the mortgage, the
increase in the value of Ivan's home and the increase in the value of only
Brenda's pension plan is not sufficient justification to deny Brenda the right to
share in the benefit to Ivan's home. That Brenda had a pension plan for which
Ivan made no claim is not sufficient justification to deny Brenda the right to share
in the benefit to Ivan's home. In sum, there are no circumstances presented by

6

the Court which would justify departing from the general rule that each party is
entitled to one-half of the marital assets.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's distribution of the property and remand for an
equitable distribution.
DATED this 22nd day of September, 1!
R0SALIE RE1LLY
^Attorney for Appellant
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